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Abstract 
In the context of the current prolonged economic crisis, we were wondering if the typical behaviour of Romanians in 
terms of their ‘fairness’ has suffered any modification. This study is trying to identify the effect of psychological 
pressure created by the economic crisis on fairness using the Ultimatum Game. We aim to look at the question if this 
hypothetical phenomenon applies mostly to people who use economic information in their day-to-day life (e.g., 
economic science students) or if it also affects different populations (e.g., psychology students). Another aim is to 
understand if any difference is influenced mainly by vocational personalities as Holland has described. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and peer-review under responsibility of PSIWORLD 2011 
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1. Introduction 
Ultimatum Game (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982) is a form of strategic interaction, which 
contradicts the general assumption that humans make rational decisions based on maximizing the results. 
During this interaction two players have to decide how to split an amount of money, which they will later 
receive for the service they provided. The first player decides on how the money should be divided (he is 
the Proposer), while the second (the Receiver) accepts or rejects the offer. If he rejects the offer neither 
player receives anything. The economic model predicts that the Proposer tends to make offers as close to 
the value of zero as they can, and the receivers tend to accept any non-zero offer.  
* Corresponding author : Prof. dr. Eugen Iordănescu, 50 Măgura str, Sibiu, 550317, România, Tel.: +40 744 557 039;  
   Fax: + 40 269 216 751, E-mail address: eugen.iordanescu@ulbsibiu.ro. 
 2012 ublished by Elsevier B.V. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of PSIWORLD2011
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
504  Alexandru Iorda˘nescu and Eugen Iorda˘nescu / Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 33 (2012) 503 – 507A. Iordanescu et al. / Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 00 (2011) 000–000 
The ultimatum game is a simplified replica of the interactions that take place on an open market and it 
contradicts the assumption that market relations based on competition raise the level of selfishness of the 
participants. 
The prior experimental results in Ultimatum Game are very different from the supposed rational 
assumption, the average of the offer being made by the Proposer to the Receiver being 40 % (Oosterbeck 
Sloof, & van de Kuilen, 2004). Previous experiments show that the individual strategy of participants in 
the Ultimatum Game and the Dictator Game is influenced by social distance. Also if both players interact 
directly, the behaviour of the Proposer will tend more towards fairness (Bohnet & Frey, 1999a, 1999b; 
Charness & Gneezy, 2007; Charness, Haruvy, & Sonsino, 2007, Cason & Mui, 1997) the Proposer 
behaviour being influenced by social cue. The fairness behaviour is also sensitive to maximum payoff, the 
level of unearned reward and the gender of players (Andreoni & Vesterlund, 2001; Eckel & Grossman, 
1998; Härdling, 2007).  
There are relevant distinctions between the economic and the non-economic (especially amongst 
psychologists) experimental approach. These distinctions make the object of contradictions regarding the 
methodology used for the experiments (Guala & Mittone, 2010; Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). The 
experiments conducted by economists use real incentive (money or goods) in order to motivate 
participants and to insure a high ecological validity. This happens in spite of Frikblom and Shogren 
(2002), who demonstrated that when subjects are rewarded, they tend to exhibit unnatural behavior. 
Hoffman, McCabe and Smith (1996) consider that when subjects have acquired an unearned reward, they 
tend to be more generous in the Dictator Game. Read (2005) discovered that the use of money as a reward 
in economic experiments influences factors like motivation, cognition or emotion and concluded that 
there is no empirical basis to sustain the use of real incentives in experiments. 
The main assumptions that lead to this contradiction refer especially to the nature of the research area 
(economic behavior). In some rare cases studies have been done to determine the possible differences that 
some characteristics of the subjects could have made, in spite of the fact that most of the subjects used in 
economic behavior experiments have been economic graduates. 
According to Holland (1997), choosing your occupation has a lot to do with your personality. 
Holland’s model states that there are six vocational personality types (Realistic, Investigative, Artistic, 
Social, Enterprising and Conventional) and just as many types of working environments. The congruency 
between the type of personality and the type of work environment has been proved more than once to be 
crucial to job satisfaction and performance. Holland’s theory stresses that ones career choices are 
determined by some specific personality factors. The six vocational personality types Holland describes 
allow predictions and descriptions regarding personal career choices, work environment stability and 
satisfaction with professional career. Smart and Umbach (2007) proved that according to Holland, 
choosing a career (or choosing an university program) is an expression of one’s personality, interests, 
abilities, values and attitudes. There are six types of academic environment, each one corresponding to 
one of Holland's vocational personality types that reflect the physical, psychological and social 
characteristics of a corresponding working environment.  
In this simplified context we consider that the Enterprising type of vocational personality, as 
described by Holland, best characterises the interests, attitudes and abilities of an undergraduate attending 
an university program in Economics. The main characteristics of this vocational personality type are 
competitiveness and leadership. On the other hand, an undergraduate program in Psychology is best 
suited to the Holland Social vocational personality, characterised mainly by the will to help, a tendency 
towards cooperation and empathy. If we consider these two personality patterns in the context of the two 
academic environments, this could be one explanation for why undergraduates attending the two 
university programs would represent different populations. This idea can be backed up by other research 
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in the field of neuro science. Thus, Zak, Stanton and Ahmadi (2007) showed that empathy is a common 
characteristic of people who make generous offers in the Ultimatum Game.   
Because the economic crisis has determined the rise in the scarcity level of resources and therefore 
increased competition for resources, we question if the general crisis of markets determined an alteration 
of the methods of negotiation, does it cause a rise of non-cooperative behavior (predicted by general 
rational decision making model) as opposed to cooperative behaviour. We also wonder if this 
hypothetical phenomenon applies mostly to people that work in a predominantly Enterprising work 
environment or if it also affects subjects working in a Social work environment. 
2. Method and design 
2.1. Participants.  
The 445 participants were randomly selected from undergraduates attending courses within the Faculty 
of Economic Sciences and Department of Psychology. The subjects have participated in a series of 
multifactorial experiments. The group of undergraduates attending courses in Economics was formed of 
250 subjects, out of which 74 % were women. The mean age of undergraduates was 21.7 (SD = 1,37). 
The group of undergraduates attending courses in Psychology included 195 subjects, out of which 83 % 
were women. The mean age of participants in this group was 21,2 (SD = 1,29) 
2.2. Experimental design and procedure.  
The undergraduates from the two university programs participated in two sets of identical single blind 
experiments that took place at the same time, in the same conditions. The subjects were informed that 
they were going to participate at an experiment regarding short-term memory and that the experiment had 
been requested by a well-known Romanian retailer. All subjects completed written consent to their 
participation in the experiment. 
For each experimental condition the factors concerning the economic context was manipulated. This 
independent variable had two levels (“crisis” vs. “non-crisis”). In order to manipulate the two levels of 
economic context, two videos were used, each five minutes in length. For the “crisis” experimental 
condition (N = 199 subjects), an interview with the president of Romania was presented. In this interview, 
there was some data regarding the bad financial situation which Romania faces (e.g., payment cuts of 25 
%, the motion regarding the cutting of pensions with 15 % etc.) For the “non-crisis” experimental 
condition (N = 246 subjects), a teleshopping show was used. The subjects took part in this experiment in 
groups of 50, each session lasted about 15 minutes. After the teleshopping show, each participant 
completed a short quiz. After the completion of the quiz, the participants were informed that their efforts 
were to be rewarded with a sum of money that they had to share with another anonymous participant in 
the experiment. The principal rules of the Ultimatum Game were followed. In this experiment, every 
participant was a Proposer. Their offer toward the anonymous partners was in lei, the Romanian currency. 
In order to simplify the data analysis, the offers were transformed in percentages.  
The sum to share was set at approximately 10 Euros (40 lei), the equivalent of 1 ‰ of gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita in Romania (IMF, 2009). For the statistical analysis, the general linear model 
(univariate) was used.   
3. Results 
The interaction effect and also the independent variables were analysed. The analysis showed a 
significant effect of the economic context on participants fairness behavior, (F1,429=4.944, p< 0,05). 
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Table 1: Estimates for Academic Environment and Economic Context (Dependent Variable D.V.: Proposer Offer in %) 
a. Estimates for Academic Environment: Proposer Offer in % b. Estimates for Economic Context : Proposer Offer in % 
Academic 
Environment Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Economic 
Context Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Lower
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Enterprising 46,518 ,972 44,607 48,429 NonCrisis 49,989 1,050 47,925 52,054 
Social 50,005 1,212 47,622 52,387 Crisis 46,534 1,145 44,283 48,785 
The mean value of the offers (in % of the total amount available) was significantly greater within the 
group of subjects from the “NonCrisis” cohort. For both experimental conditions the mean value of offer 
unexpectedly surpassed the 40 % level. This phenomenon was recorded in other experiments using 
Ultimatum Game as well (see Oosterbeck et al., 2004). The NonCrisis groups mean value of offer was 
very close to the perfect fairness (50-50). Also, the academic environment was shown to have had a 
significant effect on participants splitting behavior, F (1, 429) = 5.03, p < .05. 
The subjects that were selected from the Social vocational academic environment seem to be more 
oriented toward a perfect cooperation behaviour, as long as they have tended to propose a 50-50 split. 
There were no interaction effect of the two independent variables on splitting, F (1, 429) = .001, p > .05. 
Figure 1. Estimated marginal means for Proposer offer in % as Dependent Variable 
The smallest level of the offer was registered for the Crisis × Enterprising academic environment group 
(44.8  %),  while  the  highest  level  was  registered  for  the  NonCrisis × Social vocational academic 
environment group (51.7 %). The mean value of offer for this last experimental group is over the 50-50 
level: a result which was unexpected and proved highly irrational behavior when it comes to splitting the 
money, probably in relation with fairness behaviour sensitivity to unearned reward and the gender of 
players (Andreoni & Vesterlund, 2001; Eckel & Grossman, 1998; Härdling, 2007).  
4. Discussion and conclusion 
Based on the assumption that the economic crisis would lead to a rise in the scarcity level of resources 
and therefore a rise in general competition for those resources. Our expectation of obtaining a level of the 
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offer lower than 40 % (see Oosterbeck et al., 2004) was not confirmed. Therefore, we conclude that the 
high  level  of  the  offer  was  influenced  by  the  level  of  the  incentive,  which  was  probably  seen  by  the  
subjects as being too high for the effort they put in (Härdling, 2007; Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1996). 
Because this supposition seems plausible, the experiment should be replicated taking it into account. 
The obtained data points toward the initial supposition that both the economic and psychology students 
represented two different populations, at least when we talk about fairness behaviour. Future research is 
necessary in order to decide how the patterns described by Holland can predict aspects of economic 
behaviour. We expect that there will be significant differences between the six Holland’s vocational 
personality types. Future replications of the experiments, followed by the use of Self Directed 
Search/SDS (Holland, Powell, & Fritzsche, 1994) in order to determine the vocational personality type 
for each subject will allow for a testing of the predictive qualities of the SDS test Due to the lack of 
empirical data regarding the fairness behavior of Romanians, the general nature of the findings of the 
present study in Romanian cultural and social context is limited. 
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